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The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of dispositional and situational factors on 
cognitive biases. The theoretical background was based on Kimbrelʹs Mediated Model of Social 
Anxiety, namely the revised reinforcement sensitivity theory by Gray and McNaughton. In order 
to test the assumptions, two experiments were conducted. Study 1 (78 participants (85.9% 
females, aged 19 –21) included the induction of potential social threat, while in Study 2 (121 
participants (85.1% females, aged 19 – 23)) real threat was induced. The  Reinforcement 
Sensitivity Questionnaire was used as a measure of personality traits included in the revised 
Gray's model – BIS, BAS, Fight, Flight, and Freeze. Cognitive biases were assessed with several 
tasks: Dot Probe Task (attentional bias), Incidental Free Recall Task (memory bias), and Social 
Probability Cost Questionnaire (judgmental bias). The probability of occurrence of negative 
events was found to be higher in the experimental group as compared to the control group. BIS 
contributed positively to the prediction of probability of occurrence of negative events; and 
Freeze was significantly and positively related to attention bias towards pleasant stimuli. The 
results of the second study showed that experimentally induced circumstances of social threats 
did not affect cognitive biases. BIS and Freeze contributed positively to prediction of probability 
and distress in social context, while BIS was positively related with probability of occurrence of 
negative social events.  
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Fear and anxiety in social setting: an experimental study 
In its attempt to explain a wide range of behavioral outputs, the Reinforcement Sensitivity 
Theory, in both its original and revised versions (RST; Gray, 1987; rRST; Gray & MacNaughton, 
2000), has focused on the interplay between dispositional personality factors and situational 
parameters (constraints and affordances). RST is a biologically-based theory of personality that 
postulates three major subsystems of the brain underlie many of the individual differences seen in 
cognitive, emotional and motivational reactions. Corr and McNaughton (2012) highlighted that 
the reinforcing properties of inputs are dependent on a process of evaluation. According to 
Gray’s RST (Gray, 1987) there are three emotional systems: Behavioral Approach System (BAS), 
Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) and Fight-Flight System (FFS). BAS is responsible for 
activation of behavior toward incentives. BIS is relating related to avoidance of conditioned 
aversive stimuli, while FFS is relating to avoidance of unconditioned aversive stimuli. BIS and 
BAS are related to anxiety and impulsivity (Gray, 1981; Pickering, Corr, & Gray, 1999), while 
FFS is related to aggressiveness (Mirović, Smederevac i Čolović, 2008). In the revised model 
(Gray & McNaughton, 2000), the systems were modified: the expandedFight-Flight-Freeze 
System (FFFS) is now responsive to all punishing and threatening stimuli; whereas the BIS is no 
sensitive to goal conflict (of all kinds) – it is engaged 
 




in direction of attention to conflicting stimuli, and has the task of attempting to resolve 
conflict by inhibiting ongoing action and biasing action toward the FFFS to facilitate defensive 
behavior (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). The BAS is now sensitive to all forms of rewarding 
(including relieving) stimuli. 
Cognitive biases refer to the selective processing of emotionally relevant information 
(Mineka & Tomarken, 1989). Biased cognitive processing is related to different stages of 
information processing (e.g. perception, attention, memory, judgment, interpretation) as well as to 
different types of stimuli (negative or threatening stimuli, positive or pleasant stimuli). Bias 
occurring in the processing of information on social danger plays an important role in social 
anxiety experience. In socially-anxious individuals, bias in attention implies directions of attention 
toward threat during early, automatic stages of processing, whereas during later stages of 
processing, this type of bias includes direction of attention away from threat (Amir, Foa, & Coles, 
1998). Memory bias refers to encoding, memorizing and recalling negative or positive stimuli. 
Socially-anxious individuals exhibit memory biases for threatening social information (Mansell & 
Clark, 1999). Judgmental bias refers to the overestimation of the costs and/or probability of a 
negative event (Foa, Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996).Foa and Kozak (Foa&Kozak, 1986) 
proposed that social fears are characterized by high negative valence (cost) for social scrutiny and 
criticism as well as overestimation of their likelihood (probability). 
To date, few studies have addressed the problem of the specific impacts of situational 
factors and personality traits on a wider range of cognitive biases. Conceptual differences between 
the original and the revised RST (rRST; Corr, 2008), as well as the multitude of cognitive biases 
that have to be taken into account, add to the complexity of this task. There are still no conclusive 
answers to a number of questions concerning the relations between situational factors such as 




potential and real threats, dispositions (personality traits), and cognitive biases – namely, attention, 
memory, and judgmental biases. 
 
 
Cognitive biases: the original Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory perspective 
 
 The studies stemming from the original RST point to significant relations between 
personality traits and cognitive biases, consistent with the ‘trait – congruency hypothesis’ (Rusting, 
1998). According to this conceptual framework, the behavioral approach system (BAS) is 
positively related to cognitive biases towards pleasant stimuli, while the behavioral inhibition 
system (BIS) predicts biases towards unpleasant or threatening stimuli. A number of authors 
(Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1981, 1987; Tomarken & Keener, 1998; Tellegen, 1985; Watson, 
Wiese, Vaidya, &Tellegen, 1999) suggest that BIS and BAS are related to positive and negative 
affectivity, and thus related to selective processing of emotionally relevant stimuli. It has been 
shownthat the BAS is positively related to positive memory biases, and BIS to negative memory 
bias (Gomez & Gomez, 2002; Gomez, Cooper, McOrmond, &Tatlow, 2004).The results of some 
less recent studies, not stemming from the RST framework, support the notion that anxiety is 
related to negative memory bias (Breck& Smith, 1983; Claeys, 1989; Cloitre&Liehowitz, 1991; 
Eysenck & Byrne, 1994; O’Banion & Arkowitz, 1977). 
A number of studies explored the relations between the BIS and attentional biases, but this 
has proved inconclusive. For example, there is evidence that the BIS does not correlate with 
attentional biases (Putman, Hermans, & van Honk, 2004), and also evidence that it is negatively 
correlated with the propensity to divert attention away from negative stimuli (Avila & Torrubia, 




2008). Some studies do indicate that anxious individuals show attentional bias to threatening 
stimuli and that this phenomenon is less typical of non-anxious persons (e.g. Bar-Haim et al., 2007; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). Avila and Parcet (2002) 
suggested that, in anxious individuals, anterior attentional network is activated by non-informative 
threat-related stimuli – an effect which does not occur in non-anxious individuals. This finding 
points to the possible effect of contextual factors on the relation between the BIS and attention 
processes. 
Based on Gray’s and McNaughtonʹs work (Gray & McNaughton, 2000), Kimbrel (2008) 
assumed that the cognitive biases for negative stimuli are caused by heightened BIS sensitivity. 
Therefore, it is expected that judgmental bias or perception of threat would be positively related 
to BIS and FFFS under conditions of social threat. Results of previous research (e.g. Kimbrel, 
2009; Kimbrel, Nelson-Gray, & Mitchell, 2012)are consistent with this hypothesis. Namely, BIS 
sensitivity is positively correlated with perception of threat, while BAS is negatively related to 
perception of threat. 
 
The revised Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory perspective 
 
Within the revised RST, social situations have been recognized as particularly relevant 
triggers of neuropsychological systems’ activity. Some social situations comprise a combination 
of potential reward and punishment (i.e., approach-avoidance conflict; Gray & McNaughton, 
2003) such as situations of social interaction (e.g. conversation with attractive person), which if 
sufficiently intense should lead to the activation of the BIS. Besides the approach-avoidance 
conflict, some social situations (e.g. public speaking) include actual threats to a person's self-




esteem and, thus, can trigger the activity of the fight/flight/freeze system (FFFS; i.e., fear-related 
reactions; Smederevac, Mitrović, Čolović, & Nikolašević, 2014).Gray and McNaughton (2000) 
suggest that majority of specific phobias do not stem from classical conditioning, but rather from 
unconditioned reactions to innate fear stimuli, which include elevated activity of the FFFS. 
Supporting this distinction, Kimbrel (2008) pointed to the distinction between two classes of social 
situations, namely the 'innate anxiety stimuli' and 'innate fear stimuli'. The former imply the 
approach avoidance conflict, while the latter comprise high likelihood of negative evaluation along 
with the low likelihood of reward, provoking reactions of fear (Kimbrel, 2008). However, the 
specific effects of situational and dispositional features on cognitive biases have not explored in 
any detail yet. 
Judgmental bias, in particular,is considered to be one of crucial factors in the development 
and maintenance of social anxiety (e.g. Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Rheingold, Herbert, & Franklin, 
2003). Results have shown that socially anxious individuals tend to overestimate the likelihood 
and potential consequences of negative social events (e.g. Amir, Beard & Bower, 2005; Foa, 
Franklin, Perry & Herbert, 1996; Poulton & Andrews, 1996; Rheingold, et al., 2003; Smári, 
Pétursdóttir, & Porsteinsdóttir, 2001; Zou & Abbott, 2012). Attentional bias for negative social 
information implies selective direction of attention towards the threat (Bar-Haim et al.; MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mogg & Bradley, 1998); andresults point to selective direction of 
attention to threatening social information in socially anxious individuals (Chen, Ehlers, Clark, & 
Mansell,2002; Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004; Pishyar, Harris, & 
Menzies, 2004; Sposari & Rapee, 2007). The results of a study by Amir et al. (Amir, Foa, &Coles, 
2000) suggest that memory biases in word recall and word memorizing occur in socially anxious 
participants. However, although studies (not necessarily stemming from rRST) have demonstrated 




the relevance of social situations for several classes of cognitive biases,the results are not 
thoroughly consistent. Kimbrel (2009) foundthat attentional bias is not significantly related to 
other variables in the model, including BIS and BAS sensitivity (conceptualized according to the 
original RST). However, a number of empirical findings suggest that attention bias is related to 
dispositional features (e.g., Amir & Foa, 2001; Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Becker, Rinck, Margraf 
& Roth, 2001; Hope, Rapee, Heimberg & Dombeck, 1990; Lundh & Ost, 1996a; Mattia, 
Heimberg,& Hope, 1993), as well as to hypersensitivity of the amygdala (Fox, Hane, & Pine, 2007; 
Hariri et al., 2005). These inconsistencies may, at least partly, be attributed to methodological 
factors. To examine attention, Kimbrel used verbal stimuli, which can decrease the ecological 
validity of the data. Images of human faces with specific emotional expressions are considered to 
be more appropriate stimuli than verbal material in studies of relations between attentional 
processes and emotions (Calamaras, 2010; Kindt & Brosschot, 1997). Besides being more 
ecologically valid (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Lang, 1979), visual stimuli do not trigger semantic 
information processing, and thus do not cause the confoundingofsemantic and attentional 
processes (Weierich, Treat & Hollingworth, 2008). One of Kimbrel's methodological 
recommendations is to use dot-probe tasks for the estimation of attentional biases (Kimbrel, 2009). 
 
Current study: conceptual and methodological issues 
 
Kimbrel et al.'s study (Kimbrel, Nelson-Gray, & Mitchell, 2012)is so far the only one that 
offers a more detailed insight into the relations between RST constructs, perception of threat, and 
cognitive biases.However, several issues still remain unresolved. Kimbrel's (2008) model includes 
cognitive biases as mediators between traits and socially anxious reactions, and thus does not 




directly respond to the issue of effects of situational and dispositional features on cognitive 
processes. The results (Kimbrel et al., 2012) show positive effect of BIS – FFFS sensitivity on 
cognitive bias, as well as the negative effect of BAS. However, the specific impacts of BIS and 
FFFS were not examined. Perception of threat was shown to load on the same latent dimension as 
several cognitive biases, but the actual effects of different kinds of threat (actual vs. potential) were 
not investigated (Kimbrel et al., 2012). 
The current study attempts to address the problem of particular effects of situational 
features (potential and actual social threats) and personality traits (rRST constructs) on three 
classes of cognitive biases: memory, attentional, and judgmental biases. The study builds on 
Kimbrel et al.'s  (Kimbrel et al., 2012) work both in conceptual and methodological respects. 
Namely, the conceptual framework of these studies is the Mediated Model of Social Anxiety 
(MMSA; Kimbrel, 2009; Kimbrel et al., 2012) which is based on Gray’s reinforcement sensitivity 
theory. MMSA is unique because it integrates a different factor (e.g., personality, environmental, 
cognitive) into a unified model. Because MMSA has not yet been tested extensively and research 
on this model has emerged in recent years (Kimbrel, 2009; Kimbrel et al., 2012), the purpose of 
the present study is to provide an initial investigation into new aspects of the model. One of the 
basic assumptions of MMSA is that cognitive biases would be most pronounced under conditions 
of social threat because these conditions should activate defensive systems of personality (BIS and 
FFFS) (Kimbrel, 2008). However, the design of Kimbrel’s study, which is correlative in nature, 
limits a direct test of the mentioned hypothesis. As theoretical and empirical data predicted, 
cognitive biases would be emerged under different social circumstances. Hence, the main goals in 
this study are: 1) to examine the effects of BIS, BAS, FFFS and potential social threaton biases in 
attention, memory and judgment and 2) to examine the effects of BIS, BAS, FFFS and actual social 




threat on biases in attention, memory and judgment). In Study 1 we assumed that (a) the potential 
social threat would have significant effect on judgmental biases. Specifically, assessment of 
probability of occurrence of negative events and distress would be higher in the group who faced 
potential social threat than the control group. We assumed that there is no significant effects of 
potential social threat on biases in attention and memory, which is consistent with the results of 
some previous studies (e.g. Finucane, Whiteman, & Power, 2010; Mansell & Clark, 1999); b) BIS 
and FFFS would have significant effects on biases in attention, memory and judgment. In Study 2 
our hypotheses are as follows: a) there is no significant effects of actual social threat on cognitive 
processing (attention, memory and judgment); b) BIS and FFFS would have significant effects on 
biases in attention, memory and judgment. 
The novel aspects of this research in comparison with Kimbrel et al.'s study (Kimbrel et 
al., 2012) are: a) application of experimental research design; b) examination the effects of 
important situational factors, specially examinations the effect of actual social threat which 
employed different valences of non-verbal feedback (negative, positive and neutral) given by the 
professors; d) using rRST and e) assesing attention bias with dot-probe task. Thus, to examine the 
effect of situational factors on cognitive biases, we employed two experimental procedures which 
included potential and actual social threat. In order to address the issue of effects of personality 
traits, we included the measures of rRST constructs. In order to avoid confounds and to ensure 
better ecological validity, several methodological recommendations made by Kimbrel were also 
adopted, such as the use of dot-probe task, and the use of non-verbal measures of attentional biases 
(pictures of human faces expressing emotions of joy and fear; Calamaras, 2010; Kindt & 
Brosschot, 1997). According to the theoretical framework and the results of previous studies (Gray 
& McNaughton, 2003; Kimbrel et al., 2012), positive effects of BIS on cognitive biases may be 




expected in a situation of potential social threat, while positive effects of FFFS are more likely to 
occur in a situation of actual threat. According to the theoretical framework and the results of 
previous studies (Gray & McNaughton, 2003; Kimbrel et al., 2012), positive effects of BIS on 
cognitive biases may be expected in a situation of potential social threat (Experiment 1), while 




 The sample of 118 1st and 2nd year psychology students from the Faculty of Philosophy in 
Novi Sad (83.1% females), took part in the experimental phase of the study (the initial phase 
included gathering of demographic and questionnaire data). Participants were randomly assigned 
to conditions (experimental and control group). After the experimental phase of the study, 8(9.4%) 
participants who “saw through” the experimental situation1 were excluded, while 20(23.6%) 
participants were excluded due to an extensive number of errors (above 15%; according to previous 
                                                          
 
1 In order to check effectiveness of experimental manipulation the state of anxiety was assessed with the state version 
of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults – STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & 
Lushene, 1970) (Mihić i Novović, in preparation). The results show that there are significant effects of experimental 
manipulation on state of anxiety. Assessment of level of anxiety is higher in the group who faced potential social 
threat than the control group (experimental group: M=2.58; SD=.66; control group: M=1.90; SD=.65; t(76)=4.572; 
p<.001). In debriefing phase, participants who „saw through the experimental situation” informed experimenter that 
they didnʹt believe in experimental manipulation. All of them were in experimental group. Results show that 
participants who „saw through the experimental situation” have lower level of anxiety (M=1.75; SD=.79) in 
comparison with experimental group (t(45)=3.145; p<.001), while there no difference between first mentioned group 








research (e.g. Dinić, 2014)) on the dot probe task, and additional 12(14.6%) due to incomplete 
data. Thus 78 participants (85.9% females), aged 19 – 25 (M = 20.03, SD = 1) were included in 
the final sample. Each group included 39 participants. The groups did not differ with respect to 
gender (χ2(1)= .43; p = .52), or year of study (χ2(1)= .43; p = .52). Groups did not differ significantly 
with respect to personality traits (BIS: t(73)=1.52; p=.13; BAS: t(73)=-1.13; p=.26; Fight: t(73)=.48; 
p=.63; Flight: t(73)=-.66; p=.51; Freeze: t(73)=1.15; p=.26). There were no multivariate outliers, 
while 17 univariate outliers (z > +/– 2.50) were retained due to relatively small size of the 
groups.The participants provided written consent to participate in the study. The study was 
approved by the Departmental Ethical Committee (date: May 27th, 2014). 
In order to estimate the optimal sample size for the experiment, a priori power analysis was 
conducted in G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), according to 
recommendations by Dattalo (2008). Tests for MANOVA global effects (F tests), adjusted for 
MANCOVA, were performed. The results showed that, with 2 groups, 5 covariates, and 5 response 
variables, assuming α = .05, in order to detect an effect of medium size (f2(U) = .15) with 80% 
power, total sample size of N = 49 would be needed, with fc(30, 154) = 1.53, λ = 29.4, Wilks U = 
.57.   
Measures 
 The Reinforcement Sensitivity Questionnaire (RSQ; Smederevac, Mitrović, Čolović, 
& Nikolašević, 2014). The questionnaire was designed as a measure of the revised Reinforcement 
Sensitivity Theory constructs. In the initial and subsequent studies, the scale showed adequate 
internal and convergent validity (Krupić, Corr, Ručević, Križanić, & Gračanin, 2016; Smederevac 
et al., 2014). The questionnaire consists of 29 items with 4-point rating scales (ranging from 1- 




completely disagree to 4- completely agree).: BIS (7 items; item example: “I often worry that I 
may be criticized”), BAS (6 items; item example: “I readily accept new and exciting situations”), 
Fight (6 items; item example: “Whenever I am attacked, I fight back without hesitation”), Flight 
(5 items; “Whenever I am in a dangerous situation, I do my best to get out of it”), and Freeze (5 
items; item example: “I tend to ‘‘freeze’’ in threatening situations”).  
 Dot Probe Task (DPT). The Dot Probe Task is a measure of attention biases by means of 
reaction time (RT). The task applied in this study was developed according to procedures applied 
in previous studies (e.g., Calamars, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Tran, Lamplmayr, Pintzinger, 
& Pfabigan, 2013). The tasks consisted of 150 picture stimuli acquired from the Karolinska 
Directed Emotional Faces base (KDEF; Lundqvist, Flykt & Öhman, 1998). The choice of stimuli 
was made according to the original KDEF validation study (Goeleven, De Raedt, Leyman, & 
Verschuere, 2008). The pictures show 50 models (25 females and 25 males, aged 20 – 30 years), 
whose faces were photographed in three different emotional expressions: anger, joy, and neutral. 
Therefore, there were 50 pictures with threatening facial expressions, 50 with joyful expressions, 
and 50 neutral. Experimental trials involved paired pictures, whereby each picture of anger/joy 
was paired with a neutral picture. The overall procedure included 250 trials. Each pair of pictures 
(anger – neutral and joyful – neutral) was presented twice, (on the left and on the right side of the 
screen), adding up to 200 trials. Besides these, there were 50 filler trials consisting of 
neutral/neutral pairs. The pictures were presented on the computer one next to another, while the 
sequence of pictures was randomized for each participant. Before each trial, a focal stimulus (“+”) 
appeared in the center of the screen, and the stimulus followed 500ms later. The exposition of 
stimuli lasted 500ms (see Figure 1). The dot retrieval took place immediately after the 
disappearance of the stimulus. The dot was exposed for 1100ms. The dot appeared the same 




number of times on the left and on the right side of the screen. Thus the dot was once on the side 
of a valent (emotionally charged) stimulus (congruent, RTC trials), and the second time on the side 
of a neutral stimulus (incongruent, RTI trials). Bias indexes (BI) for threatening and pleasant 
stimuli were calculated, according to the formula BI = RTI – RTC (Tran, Lamplmayr, Pintzinger, 
& Pfabigan, 2013). The positive BI score points to higher bias, more precisely to more pronounced 
direction of attention to stimuli of certain valence (attention vigilance). The opposite case points 
to diverting of attention, in other words to diverting from further processing the information. 
The Incidental Free Recall Task (IFRT).This task assesses memory bias by the average 
number of memorized words of positive / negative valence. There were 38 words in total, split into 
three lists to control for serial position effect (Kimbrel et al., 2012), whereby 30 words were stimuli 
(15 positive and 15 negative), while 8 words (4 positive and 4 negative) served as “buffers”. The 
buffers were presented at the beginning/end of each list, in order to control for the effect of the 
serial position (the position of the word in the list). The buffers were not used in the statistical 
analyses (Mansell & Clark, 1999). The three word lists were assembled taking into account the 
condition that there are no more than two negative or positive words in a row (Mansell & Clark, 
1999). According to recommendations from previous studies (Kimbrel et al., 2012), the categories 
of words of different valence were equal with regard to word length and frequency. The choice of 
words was based on the results of a pilot study where negative words (related to social anxiety and 
low social achievement) were detected, as well as the positive words which denoted social 
achievement and social success. Within each block, the words were shown on the screen in 
sequence. In the ‘encoding phase’, the participant’s task was to estimate whether the words 
describe the way that others see and estimate them during public appearances (by pressing the left 
mouse button for yes, and right for no). This phase was followed by a 2-minute cognitive 




distraction, where the procedure by Breck and Smith (1983) was applied. The participants were 
asked to mark (“strike through”) letter E on a sheet of paper where letters were printed in a random 
order. Upon the end of this task, the participants were asked to write as many words as they 
remembered from the encoding phase, regardless of the order in which the words were shown. 
This phase lasted 4 minutes (see Figure 2). Within blocks, the list of words and the letter that had 
to be marked were varied, while the memory task was the same. The index of negative memory 
bias was calculated by subtracting the number of positive words from the number of negative 
words. Negative scores point to memory bias towards negative words (Kimbrel, 2009; Matthews, 
Mogg, May, & Eysenck, 1989). 
The Social Probability Cost Questionnaire (SPCQ; McManus, Clark & Hackmann, 
2000).The SPCQ is a measure of judgmental biases, and comprises two 33-item scales. On a scale 
from 0 to 100, the participants rate how bad or disturbing each of the given social events (in the 
near future) can be for them (0 – not at all bad, 100 – really bad), as well as how likely each of the 
event is to happen to them (0 – not at all likely, 100 – almost sure to happen). The items describe 
social events like being criticized, saying something stupid, beginning to stutter, opinion will be 
ridiculed, etc. Both scales have shown satisfactory internal consistency(α = .96; α = .97) in a study 
by McManus et al. (McManus, Clark, & Hackmann, 2000). Given that the SPCQ had not thus far 
been applied to the Serbian population, a validation study was conducted, which showed that the 
measure had satisfactory validity, reliability, representativeness, and homogeneity (Ranđelović & 
Ranđelović, 2014). 
Procedure 




 Two weeks prior to the experimental procedure, participants completed the personality 
assessment measures. The experimental procedure included the induction of potential social threat, 
namely the 'Bogus-speech threat manipulation' (BSTM), which was designed in accordance with 
similar procedures applied in previous studies (e.g. Lee & Telch, 2008; Singh, 2011). Participants 
were randomly assigned to 2 experimental conditions. In both groups, participants' task was to 
write up a design of an experimental study on a chosen topic (Violence, Corruption, and Proneness 
to risky behavior). Task completion time was limited to 10 minutes. Both groups were informed 
that the study designs will be rated by a three-member commitee, consisting of university teachers. 
In the Experimental Group, the participants were additionally 'required' to give oral presentations 
of their designs before the committee. In the Control Group, there was no such requirement. Upon 
the completion of the written part of the task, study designs were 'forwarded' to the committee, 
while the participants completed the computer-administered tasks and the questionnaires. After 
the dependent variables were assessed, written and oral debriefing was given to participants.  
Results 
Multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was used in order to examine the 
relations between the independent variables (experimental conditions and personality traits) on 
cognitive biases. Experimental condition (2 levels: Oral or no-oral presenttaion) was the 
categorical predictor, and factor scores on rRSQ dimensions were continuous predictors. The 
following cognitive bias indexes were entered as dependent variables: two measures of judgmental 
biases (likely cost associated with the upcoming negative events, and probability that the event 
will happen), two indexes of attention biases (attention biases for threatening and pleasant stimuli), 




and an index of negative memory bias. For the grouping variable (experimental condition), 
deviation coding was applied. 
Bivariate correlations (Table 1) show strong positive correlations between BIS and Freeze, 
Flight and Freeze, as well as between two modalities of judgmental bias. BIS and BAS correlated 
moderately and negatively.  
- insert Table 1 about here - 
MANCOVA (Table 2) suggests that the set of independent variables explained a 
substantial amount of the variance of SPCQ - cost (p < .05) and SPCQ – probability (p < .05). BIS 
was the only factor to significantly (and positively) contribute to the prediction of SPCQ - cost. 
Experimental condition predicted the score on SPCQ – probability, whereby the experimental 
group scored significantly higher than the control group (Mexp = 36.21; Mcont = 28.24; F (1) = 4.20, 
p < .05). Freeze contributed significantly and positively to the prediction of attention bias towards 
pleasant stimuli.  
- insert Table 2 about here – 
Behavioral parameters for attentional bias (response times – RT) are showed in Table 3 
and Table 4.  








The results provide support for both the assumption that situational features affect 
cognitive biases, and for Gray's hypothesis that BIS contributes to the perception of potential 
dangers. The results indicate that the assessment of probability of occurrence of negative events 
and distress is higher in the group who faced potential social threat. This result is consistent with 
the assumptions, supported by both the rRST (Gray & McNaughton, 2003) and Kimbrel's model 
(Kimbrel, 2008) that the situational featurestrigger the perception of social threats. The activating 
event (the anticipation of public exposure), launches the "cognitive scheme of danger", which is 
the basis for increased alertness.   
Regardless of the experimental manipulation, BIS is responsible for the anticipation of 
negative outcomes in new and ambiguous situations (Corr, 2011; Gray & McNaughton, 2003). 
The results indicate that BIS as a dispositional factor, shapes the estimation of occurrence of 
negative outcomes in new situations. With regard to the characteristics of the experimental 
manipulation, it may be important to point out that the situation did significantly differ from the 
usual circumstances that the participants were accustomed to during course practical. Namely, it 
is possible that the work on a new task itself (preparation of speech) did contribute to the overall 
perception of tension among participants. 
Experimentally induced potential social threat did not affect either attention or memory 
biases. This result is in line with recent studies, which report that different quality of induced 
affects (e.g. Happiness and sadness) has no effect on the various aspects of attention (alertness, 
orientation, and selectivity) (Finucane, Whiteman, & Power, 2010). The only effect that is 
registered in the domain of attention bias is the effect of Freeze on attention bias toward positive 
stimuli. Although there is a possibility that this effect is an artifact, this result may point to the 
tendency of people scoring high on Freeze to focus their attention on pleasant stimuli. Namely, a 




person can revert to the mechanisms that would enable a "getaway" from a new and potentially 
demanding situation. In light of these results, this mechanism may point to positive information as 




At the end of the Phase 1 of the study, during which demographic and questionnaire data 
were gathered, the sample comprised 169 students of the 1st and 2nd years from the Faculty of 
Philosophy in Niš. A total of 150 participants took part in the experimental phase of the study. 
Four participants withdrew during the write-up of draft speeches, while additional four withdrew 
in the later stages of the study. The data of twenty-one (31.5%) participants were excluded from 
the analyses: 14(21%) failed to complete the entire set of measures administered in the study, 
3(4.5%) claimed that they saw through the experimental manipulation, 3(4.5%) were univariate 
outliers (z >+/– 2.50), and 1(1.5%) multivariate outlier (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Therefore, 
the final sample comprised 121 participants (103(85.1%) female), aged 19 – 23 (M = 19.80, SD = 
.78). Experimental and control groups are equal with respect to gender (χ2(2)= 1.44, p= .49) and 
year of study (χ2(2)= .90, p= .64). The participants were randomly assigned to groups. The groups 
do not differ with regard to personality traits BIS: F(2,118)=.07; p=.93; BAS: F(2,118)=-.14; p=.87; 
Fight: F(2,118)=.05; p=.95; Flight: F(2,118)=-.82; p=.44; Freeze: F(2,118)=.03; p=.98).The participants 
provided written consent to participate in the study. The study was approved by the Ethical 
Committee at the Department of Psychology, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad (date: 
May 27th, 2014). 




A priori power analysis was conducted in G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007) in order to determine the optimal sample size. Tests for MANOVA global effects 
(F tests), adjusted for MANCOVA, were performed. The results showed that, with 3 groups, 5 
covariates, and 5 response variables, assuming α = .05, in order to detect an effect of medium size 
(f2(U) = .15) with 80% power,  total sample size of  N = 56 participants would be needed, with 
fc(35, 187.52) = 1.49, λ = 35.34, Wilks U = .56.  
Procedure 
The experimental procedure took place two weeks after the demographic and questionnaire 
data were gathered. A Social threat induction procedure (STIP) was applied, also known as 'The 
public speech task' (npr. Bielak & Moscovitc, 2012; Kimbrel, 2008; 2009; 2012; Mansell, Clark, 
Ehlers, & Chen, 1999). Participants' task was to give a presentation on a chosen topic (using a 
written draft) before a committee who assessed their presentation skills by giving non-verbal 
feedback to presenters. Participants were randomly assigned to three experimental conditions, 
which differed by the valence of the feedback, (non-verbal signals expressed by the committee). 
The conditions were chosen according to previous studies (Chaikin, Sigler, & Derlega, 1974; 
Perowne & Mansell, 2002; Veljaca & Rapee, 1998), and were named Negative Feedback (NF), 
Positive Feedback (PF), and Neutral Feedback (NF). The first two conditions included three non-
verbal signals each (NF: frowning, shaking head left to right as a sign of disagreement, leaning 
back as a sign of rejection; PF: smile as a sign of recognition, nodding head as a sign of agreement, 
leaning forward as a sign of interest and liking), while neutral feedback implied the lack of facial 
expression and bodily motions.  




During the experimental procedure, sheets of paper with three topics (1. Violence, 2. 
Corruption, 3. Proneness to risky behaviors) printed out were administered to participants, with 
the instruction to pick only one topic and write a draft speech in 10 minutes. After that, the 
experimenter randomly took the drafts from the participants, in order for the examiners to 
randomly call out the students to give speeches. Each of the participants had 1 minute to present 
the topic to the committee, while the examiners 'rated public speech skills' by giving non-verbal 
feedback. The experimenter controlled the timing using a stop-watch. The whole procedure lasted 
approximately 35 minutes. After the presentations were completed, the participants from the same 
group went to the computer classroom, where cognitive biases were assessed. This phase lasted 40 






The same measures as in Experiment 1 were applied. The only difference was that the 
instructions were in the past tense, since it was important to know how the participants felt in the 
current situation of social threat. 
Results 
Bivariate correlations (Table 5) suggest that the independents correlate moderately, except 
for BIS and Freeze, which show somewhat stronger positive correlation, as well as two SPCQ 
variables, which correlate strongly and positively. BIS, Flight, and Freeze correlate moderately 




and positively with the two SPCQ variables. Two indexes of attention bias correlate modestly and 
negatively. 
- insert Table 5 about here - 
MANCOVA (Table 6) shows that the set of independents explained a substantial amount 
of variance of SPCQ – cost (p < .001) and SPCQ – probability (p < .001). BIS and Freeze 
contributed positively to prediction of SPCQ – cost. BIS positively affected attention biases 
towards pleasant stimuli, while Freeze was negatively related to attention bias towards pleasant 
stimuli. While bivariate correlations between attention bias towards pleasant stimuli and BIS as 
well as FFFS were non-significant the same relations were significant in the MANCOVA. Namely, 
in MANCOVA, statistical significance of standardized beta coefficient for Freeze is 0.046.  This 
is marginally statistically significant result and should be taken with reserve. Statistical 
significance of standardized beta coefficient for BIS is 0.022. This result is theoretically 
implausible and most probably an artifact. This effect may be attributed to outliers. Experimental 
conditions did not affect any of the dependents. 
- insert Table 6 about here – 
Behavioral parameters for attentional bias (response times – RT) are showed in Table 7 
and Table 8. 
- insert Table 7 and 8 about here – 
Discussion 




Experimentally induced circumstances of social threats, in their own regard, do not affect 
attentional, memory or judgmental biases. The situation which was to provoke a real threat was 
apparently strong enough for the participants in all three groups, so that the effect of experimental 
manipulation did not occur. In other words, preparation of a speech and presentation before the 
professors is perceived as a consistent social distress regardless of the type of non-verbal feedback. 
BIS and Freeze have significant effects on judgmental and attention biases. BIS and Freeze are 
positively related to the assessment of cost of occurrence of undesirable social events, while BIS 
affects the assessment of distress. Such effects occur in groups of highly socially anxious 
individuals in experimental conditions similar to the conditions in this study (Pozo, Carver, 
Wellens, & Scheier, 1991; February & Rapee, 1998; Winton et al, 1995). However, although this 
study did not include a group of high-anxiety subjects, it did include a highly provocative situation, 
which can be perceived as an intense social stressor (the presence of authority and the importance 
of their feedback). The emergence of BIS as the primary positive correlate of threat perception is 
in line with the expectations stemming from both MMSA and RST (Corr, 2011; Gray & 
McNaughton, 2003; Kimbrel, 2008). People who tend to perceive the environment as potentially 
threatening and harassing, appear to show pronounced negative judgmental bias. 
BIS reactivity was a significant positive predictor of attention bias towards pleasant stimuli. 
It is possible that the positive stimuli in the case of real danger may represent an adequate 
distractor, which attracts the attention of people with high BIS. On the other hand, people with 
high Freeze may perceive pleasant stimuli as a disturbing factor that interferes with cognitive 
processes responsible for the processing of signals of danger. 
 
Final discussion 




The overall goal of this study was to explore the differences in cognitive processes in two 
different situations, which provoke potential and real threat. Results are in line with the basic 
premises of rRST (Gray & McNaughton, 2003), pointing to the differences between the cognitive 
processes associated with anxiety and fear. In case of potential threats, the role of cognitive 
processes is to detect possible inconvenience and distress, whereby BIS plays a key role in shaping 
of cognitive biases related to the cost of future events. Besides, BIS has a crucial role in the 
processes of signals of real danger. People with high BIS experience each new situation as an 
opportunity to scan the environment in search of possible dangers and risks. Differences between 
potential and actual threats are reflected in different cognitive processes that are activated under 
the influence of BIS. In the case of potential threats, BIS contributes to the assessment of cost, 
while in the circumstances of real threat, it contributes to attention biases as well. 
The role of pleasant stimuli is particularly important for the understanding of attention 
focus in provocative situations. In case of potential threats, pleasant stimuli serve as distractors for 
people with high Freeze, while in the case of real threats, pleasant stimuli are distractors for people 
with high BIS. Focusing on positive stimuli in people with high Freeze may point to specific 
cognitive strategies for coping with potential stress. Positive stimuli serve the same purpose for 
the people with high BIS in cases of real danger. The results point to the possibility that the type 
of threat may be a moderator of the effects of BIS and Freeze on attention biases to pleasant stimuli. 
An alternative explanation for this result is the finding that people with high BIS and Freeze point 
greater attention to positive stimuli because they are incongruent with the threat that currently 
occupies their cognitive capacities. Certainly this is a provocative result, which raises the question 
of cognitive processing of positive stimuli in stressful situations. 




Importantly, differences between results which are related to effects of personality traits 
on cognitive biases, can be explained by using of different assessment methods. In line with this,  
the judgement biases were assessed by self-reports, whereas attention biases and memory biases 
were measured based on task performance. Therefore, the judgement biases and the personality 
measures probably share more method variance what could also explain why SPCQ was generally 
more strongly related to rRST constructs. Previous evidence suggests that correlations between 
personality dimensions and processing of emotional stimuli are small (e.g., Gomez & Gomez, 
2002; Kerns, 2005; Vermeulen, Luminet, & Corneille, 2006). Therefore, future research should 
include multi-method assessment of BIS, BAS and FFFS sensitivity (e.g. behavioral tasks) and 
measurement of judgmental biases based on task performance. 
Experimental manipulation affects only the cognitive processes that can be easily modeled 
under the influence of the current circumstances, such as cognitive bias. The lack of any effect on 
memory processes indicates that short-term effects provoked by experimental conditions were not 
sufficient to cause changes in memory. In other words, it is possible that stressful situations trigger 
the activity of working memory, but not long-term memory. 
It should be noted that cognitive biases were measured after the threatening situation. For 
instance, the attentional bias toward positive stimuli in high BIS individuals may also be mediated 
by feelings of relief that the stressing situation has been overcome. Thus, the two experiments 
mainly differ in the temporal relation between the social threat and cognitive bias assessments. 
The results point to the complexity of the interplay among situational features, personality 
traits and cognitive processes. Situations of potential threat seem to engage cognitive processes 
more than the situations of real threat, possibly due to their more pronounced ambiguity and 




openness to interpretation. In the situations of real threat, effects of personality traits emerge, 
probably triggered by the need to overcome present danger. 
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Experiment 1: Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations(Pearson correlations; two-
tailed)(N =78) 




th AB - pl NMBI 
BAS -.51***          
Fight .07 .17         
Flight .34** -.14 -.10        
Freeze .64*** -.23* -.02 .52***       
SPCQ  cost .41*** -.22* .11 .18 .28*      
SPCQ 
probability .30** -.13 .22 .03 .24* .63***     
AB – th -.11 .11 -.08 -.17 -.24* -.01 .11    
AB - pl .09 .07 .11 -.02 .26* .10 .09 -.24*   
NMBI -.23* .06 -.05 -.03 -.11 -.18 -.14 -.13 -.05  
M 2.20 2.75 2.3 2.72 1.90 32.23 34.27 -.65 .31 -.67 
SD .61 .55 .59 .55 .63 16.26 15.89 25.44 24.42 2.31 
α .82 .78 .76 .61 .79 .94 .94    
Note. SPCQ – cost: judgmental bias – assessment of cost (negative impact) of events in near future; SPCQ 
– probability: judgmental bias – assessment of likelihood of negative events in near future; AB – th: 
attention bias towards threatening stimuli; AB – pl: attention bias towards pleasant stimuli; NMBI – 
negative memory bias;  * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  





Experiment 1: Results of MANCOVA (N =78) 
Variable SPCQ – cost SPCQ- probability 
Attention bias  
threatening stimuli 




 B  (ß) B  (ß) B  (ß) B  (ß) B  (ß) 
BIS 8.69 (.33)* 4.12 (.16) 7.87 (.19) -3.97 (-.10) -1.28 (-.34) 
BAS -1.1 (-.04) -.91 (-.03) 6.55 (.14) 3.17 (.07) -.27 (-.06) 
Fight 2.54 (.09) 5.37 (.20) -5.46 (-.13) 4.05 (.10) -.08 (-.02) 
Flight 2.72 (.09) -1.82 (-.06) -3.78 (-.08) -8.84 (-.20) .3 (.07) 
Freeze -.14 (-.01) 3.62 (.14) -11.34 (-.28) 17.28 (.45)* .09 (.02) 
EC 3.04 (.19) 3.56 (.23)* -1.47 (-.06) -.39 (-.02) .51 (.22) 
R2 .21 .19 .09 .13 .11 
Adj.R2 .15 .13 .01 .05 .03 























































Note. SPCQ – cost: judgmental bias – assessment of cost (negative impact) of events in near future; 
SPCQ – probability: judgmental bias – assessment of likelihood of negative events in near future; AB – 
th: attention bias towards threatening stimuli; AB – pl: attention bias towards pleasant stimuli; NMBI – 
negative memory bias; SPCQ – cost, SPCQ – probability, AB – th, AB – pl, NMBI as a dependent 
variables;EC – experimental condition as a independent variable (potential danger); B – unstandardized 











Experiment 1:  Behavioral parameters for attentional bias (response times – RT) (N =78) 
Attentional bias Min Max M SD Sk Ku 
RT 
RTC_ anger 289.83 558.45 392.19 58.29 .331 -.232 
RTI_ anger 275.28 577.36 391.54 61.89 .586 .268 
RTC_ joyful 272.19 555.91 392.39 59.26 .387 -.197 
RTI_ joyful 278.44 528.72 392.70 62.08 .309 -.589 
RT_neutral 352.91 640.91 484.79 74.56 .215 -.696 
Bias indexes BI_ anger -52.80 58.15 -.65 25.44 .013 -.197 BI_ joyful -67.29 69.39 .31 24.42 -.282 1.194 
Note. RT – response times; RTC_anger – congruent trials for threatening stimuli; 
RTI_anger – incongruent trials for threatening stimuli; RT_neutral – responses times for 
neutral stimuli; RTC_joyful – congruent trials for pleasant stimuli; RTI_joyful – 
incongruent trials for pleasant stimuli; BI_anger – bias indexes for threatening stimuli; BI_ 
joyful – bias indexes for pleasanr stimuli; Min – minimum; Max – maximum; Sk – 
skewness; Ku – kurtosis. 
 
Table 4 
Experiment 1:  Behavioral parameters for attentional bias (response times – RT) (NE =39; 
NK =39) 
 Attentional 
bias Group Min Max M SD Sk Ku 
RT 
RTC_ anger E 293.01 507.28 396.27 53.65 .236 -.308 K 289.83 558.45 388.10 63.02 .455 -.120 
RTI_ anger E 275.28 545.92 393.56 61.51 .552 .237 K 292.76 577.36 389.52 63.01 .648 .509 
RTC_ joyful E 272.19 527.68 398.14 59.14 .228 -.259 K 290.54 555.91 386.64 59.59 .573 .142 
RTI_ joyful E 305.83 528.72 399.33 59.75 .470 -.327 K 278.44 525.94 386.06 64.40 .246 -.820 
RT_neutral E 357.86 633.36 491.07 71.60 .142 -.616 K 352.91 640.91 478.50 77.83 .323 -.667 
BI_ anger E -52.80 58.15 -2.71 26.28 .334 .058 





indexes K -47.83 52.44 1.41 24.75 
-
.336 -.122 
BI_ joyful E -67.29 69.39 1.19 29.39 
-
.430 .584 
K -44.09 55.33 -.58 18.52 .140 1.395 
Note. E – experimental group; K – control group. 
 
Table 5 
Experiment 2: Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations (Pearson correlations; two-
tailed) (N =121) 




th AB - pl NMBI 
BAS -.35***          
Fight -.03 .18         
Flight .48*** -.11 .05        
Freeze .58*** -.29** -.15 .46***       
SPCQ  cost .48*** -.08 .03 .35*** .47***      
SPCQ 
probability .41*** -.07 -.10 .30** .38*** .73***     
AB – th .08 -.12 .07 -.04 -.03 -.10 -.11    
AB - pl .16 -.12 -.02 .01 -.05 .05 .09 -.31**   
NMBI .03 .01 -.01 -.06 .06 .01 .00 .00 .06  
M 2.29 2.94 2.42 2.60 1.91 36.04 37.16 -4.01 1.12 -.21 
SD .58 .49 .62 .49 .62 2.58 19.77 23.12 27.96 2.05 
α .78 .72 .82 .50 .77 .96 .95    
Note. SPCQ – cost: judgmental bias – assessment of cost (negative impact) of events in near future; SPCQ 
– probability: judgmental bias – assessment of likelihood of negative events in near future; AB – th: 
attention bias towards threatening stimuli; AB – pl: attention bias towards pleasant stimuli; NMBI – 










Experiment 2: Results of MANCOVA (N =121) 
Variable SPCQ –  cost 
SPCQ – 
probability 
Attention bias – 
threatening stimuli 




 B (ß) B (ß) B (ß) B (ß) B (ß) 
BIS 11.06 (.31)** 10.62 (.31)* 5.38 (.14) 13.42 (.28)* .17 (.05) 
BAS 4.4 (.11) 4.87 (.12) -6.46 (-.14) -4.9 (-.09) .17 (.04) 
Fight 2.03 (.06) -2.89 (-.09) 3.59 (.10) -1.43 (-.03) .01 (.00) 
Flight 2.44 (.06) 3.33 (.08) -4.46 (-.10) -1.11 (-.02) -.46 (-.11) 
Freeze 9.86 (.30)** 5.63 (.18) -3.57 (-.10) -10.6 (-.24)* .32 (.10) 
EC1 2.26 (.09) 1.08 (.04) 3.65 (.13) -.81 (-.02) -.19 (-.07) 
EC2 -1.51 (-.06) -2.15 (-.09) -.42 (-.01) -4.16 (-.12) .00 (.00) 
R2 .31 .23 .05 .08 .02 
Adj.R2 .27 .18 .00 .03 -.04 









































































Note. SPCQ – cost: judgmental bias – assessment of cost (negative impact) of events in near future; 
SPCQ – probability: judgmental bias – assessment of likelihood of negative events in near future; 
AB – th: attention bias towards threatening stimuli; AB – pl: attention bias towards pleasant 
stimuli; NMBI – negative memory bias; SPCQ – cost, SPCQ – probability, AB – th, AB – pl, 
NMBI as a dependent variables; EC1 – experimental condition 1 as a independent variable 
(negative feedback); EC2 – experimental condition 2 as a independent variable (positive 
feedback); EC3 – experimental condition 3 as a independent variable(neutral feedback); B – 
unstandardized regression coefficients; β – standardized regression coefficients; * p < .05, ** p < 
.01, *** p < .001.  
 
 






Experiment 2:  Behavioral parameters for attentional bias (response times – RT) (N =121) 
Attentional bias Min Max M SD Sk Ku 
RT 
RTC_anger 331.41 627.19 432.92 55.92 .767 .799 
RTI_ anger 323.48 609.48 428.91 57.65 .724 .562 
RTC_ joyful 338.06 597.86 432.61 53.95 .750 .713 
RTI_ joyful 338.61 677.83 433.72 63.51 1.201 2.376 
RT_neutral 408.14 726.32 532.10 69.10 .583 .316 
Bias indexes BI_ anger -62.11 58.52 -4.00 23.12 .312 .128 BI_ joyful -79.82 81.06 1.12 27.96 .334 1.153 
 
Table 8 
Experiment 2:  Behavioral parameters for attentional bias (response times – RT) (NNEGF =41; 
NPOSF =41; NNEUF =39) 
 
Attentional bias Group Min Max M SD Sk Ku 
RTC_anger 
NEGF 354.37 594.80 436.17 57.65 .944 .688 
POZF 349.09 552.63 429.81 52.23 .168 -.810 
NEUF 331.41 627.19 432.76 59.00 1.053 2.142 
RTI_ anger 
NEGF 341.00 609.48 435.10 59.74 1.047 1.203 
POZF 334.24 556.36 425.63 55.93 .396 -.209 
NEUF 323.48 575.84 425.84 58.18 .707 .673 
RTC_ joyful 
NEGF 359.15 586.53 438.23 54.29 .955 .986 
POZF 342.10 552.65 428.48 52.92 .382 -.225 
NEUF 338.06 597.86 431.04 55.55 .950 1.580 
RTI_ joyful 
NEGF 338.61 656.50 438.27 70.09 1.211 1.854 
POZF 340.06 554.22 426.01 51.47 .239 -.573 
NEUF 343.50 677.83 437.05 68.42 1.490 3.356 
RT_neutral 
NEGF 416.18 726.32 535.22 72.79 .945 .858 
POZF 408.14 650.23 526.50 66.15 .058 -.976 
NEUF 413.95 720.95 534.71 69.61 .636 .802 
BI_anger NEGF -45.19 47.39 -1.07 24.24 .334 -.537 
 POZF -50.69 58.49 -4.16 21.42 .351 .881 NEUF -62.11 58.52 -6.93 23.85 .274 .538 
BI_joyful 
NEGF -37.04 81.06 .05 28.33 1.077 .892 
POZF -79.82 45.56 -2.47 26.86 -.870 1.680 
NEUF -55.81 80.92 6.02 28.71 .611 .957 



































Figure 2. The trial timing of Incidental Free Recall Task 
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